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Abstract 
Since the end of the Cold War New Zealand has participated in numerous 
international interventions, both within the Asia-Pacific region and further afield. As a small 
state with limited resources and influence what have been the primary motivating factors 
that have influenced New Zealand’s decisions to intervene? Can the decisions to intervene 
be best explained by realism, liberalism, constructivism, or a combination of these theories? 
This essay will assess the motivating factors for New Zealand’s involvement in international 
interventions by analysing four case studies where New Zealand participated in an 
intervention – Bosnia, East Timor, Afghanistan, and the Solomon Islands. This essay will also 
assess whether the motivating factors for intervening within New Zealand’s geographic 
region differ from those outside its region, and whether there is a difference in approach 
taken by the two main political parties in New Zealand –Labour and National. The essay 
concludes that while there were elements of realism and constructivism in the decisions to 
intervene, liberalism provides that best explanation for the decision to intervene in three of 
the four case studies. The fourth case study, the Solomon Islands, is best explained by the 
realist factors of regional security and upholding New Zealand’s relationship with Australia.  
The essay finds that while the motivations for intervening in three of the four case studies 
were similar, the motivations for intervening within the Asia-Pacific region were slightly 
more realist. The motivations to intervene were similar regardless if National or Labour 
were in government. 
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Introduction 
 
The decision to intervene in another state with military force is perhaps one of the 
most difficult and challenging decisions any government will have to make. The practice of 
intervention poses serious human, material and political risks that no government would 
take lightly. Despite the risks, international interventions are a common feature of 
international politics, with states intervening for a myriad of reasons. Since the end of the 
Cold War, New Zealand has participated in numerous interventions including deployments 
to Bosnia, Bougainville, the Sinai, the Solomon Islands, Iraq, Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, 
East Timor and Mozambique. As a small state with limited resources and power what have 
been the motivating factors that have influenced New Zealand’s decisions to participate in 
these interventions? 
 
This essay will assess the motivating factors for New Zealand’s involvement in 
international interventions. Are the motivations best explained by realist, liberal, or 
constructivist theory, or by some combination of these? The essay will also assess whether 
the motivating factors for interventions within the Asia-Pacific region differ to the factors 
that have motivated New Zealand to intervene outside of the region. As a small and 
relatively minor player in international politics, but also a regional leader in the South 
Pacific, New Zealand’s motivations for intervening within its geographic region may be 
different to the reasons for contributing to interventions outside the region. The third 
question this essay will assess is whether the motivations for intervening differ between the 
two main political parties in New Zealand. It has been argued that the National party prefers 
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a more realist approach to international relations, while the Labour party is more liberal in 
its foreign policy outlook.1  
 
 Understanding the motivations for New Zealand’s past participation in interventions 
may help predict or understand the motivations for any future interventions by providing 
the historical context against which future decisions can be assessed. While no two 
interventions are the same, and the circumstance under which the decision to intervene 
may not be applicable to another case, the decision making and rationale behind the 
decisions are often similar.  
 
This essay is divided into four chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter discusses 
the concept of intervention, how it differs from war, and provides a definition of 
intervention focusing on the use of military force. The reason for focusing on the use of 
military force is to narrow the definition of intervention to exclude actions, such as 
economic or diplomatic sanctions, that may be considered interference rather than 
intervention. The use of military force is also more contentious than diplomatic or economic 
sanctions and carries far greater human, political, and material risk. The second chapter will 
outline the theoretical framework against which New Zealand’s decisions to intervene will 
be assessed. The three main international relations theories discussed in this chapter are 
realism, liberalism, and constructivism. This chapter briefly outlines each of the theories, 
and how international interventions fit within each paradigm. The essay will then move onto 
assess four case studies where New Zealand has participated in an intervention. 
 
                                                          
1
 McCraw, David. ‘New Zealand’s Defence Policy: From Realism to Idealism?’, Defence and Security Analysis, 
24:1, pp. 19-32. 
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The third chapter assesses New Zealand’s motivations for participating in two 
interventions within the Asia-Pacific region. The first intervention analysed is the decision by 
the National government to intervene in East Timor in 1999. New Zealand’s presence in East 
Timor was then continued by the Labour government when it came to power in late 1999. 
The main motivating factor for the intervention in East Timor was to protect the human and 
democratic rights of the East Timorese after they had voted to gain independence from 
Indonesia. The National government was also concerned with developing its relationship 
with Australia within the context of the Closer Defence Relations, and demonstrating that it 
was a reliable ally that would contribute to regional crises when they occurred. The second 
intervention assessed in this chapter is the decision by the Labour government to 
participate in the Australian led intervention in the Solomon Islands in 2003. While the 
decision to intervene in East Timor was primarily motivated by the liberal ideals of 
protecting human rights, the decision to intervene in the Solomon Islands was motivated by 
more realist factors. The primary reasons were the threat of having a failing or failed state in 
the Pacific region, and upholding New Zealand’s international reputation and its relationship 
with Australia.  
 
The fourth and final chapter will assess New Zealand’s motivations for intervening in 
Bosnia in 1994. It also addresses the decision to participate in the intervention in 
Afghanistan in 2001, and the ‘War on Terror’. The decision by the National government to 
deploy forces to assist with the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia (UNPROFOR) was 
made after a request from the UN for extra troops to assist with its operations in Bosnia. 
While New Zealand did not have any strategic or national interests at stake in the conflicts 
in the former Yugoslavia, the National government felt it did have an interest in ensuring 
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that the credibility of the United Nations (UN) was upheld.  At the time the UN’s credibility 
was threatened over its ability to deal with the conflicts in the Balkans and the genocide in 
Rwanda. The decision to intervene was also motivated by the National government’s desire 
to develop New Zealand’s international reputation, especially with its traditional allies after 
the breakup of the ANZUS alliance. The second intervention assessed in this chapter is the 
decision by the Labour government to deploy the Special Air Service (SAS) to Afghanistan in 
2001, and to take responsibility for a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in 2003. This 
decision was primarily motivated by a liberal belief in upholding international law and to 
prevent the Taliban from providing Al Qaeda a training base from where it could operate. 
The desire to uphold international law was further demonstrated in the decision not to join 
the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ in the invasion of Iraq, but to deploy army engineers to Iraq in 
the aftermath of the Iraq War in 2003. 
 
The four case studies were chosen as they represent New Zealand’s largest military 
deployments since the end of the Cold War. The case studies also represent two 
interventions that occurred within the Asia-Pacific region and two outside of the Asia-Pacific 
region. This will help to assess whether the factors that motivate New Zealand to intervene 
within its geographic region are different to the motivations for interventions outside of its 
region. The case studies are also split evenly by the governing party that made the decision 
to intervene. With the centre-right National Party in government for the interventions in 
Bosnian and East Timor, and the centre-left Labour Party in government for the decisions to 
intervene in Afghanistan and the Solomon Islands.  
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The essay concludes that while there are elements of realism and constructivism in 
the decisions to intervene, New Zealand’s decisions to intervene in the four case studies 
were primarily motivated by liberal factors. The motives have also been relatively consistent 
whether National or Labour are in government. The case studies suggest that realist factors 
may play a larger role in the decision to intervene within the Asia-Pacific than they do for 
interventions outside the Asia-Pacific region.  
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Chapter One: The Concept of Intervention 
International Interventions are amongst the most contentious and debated subject 
matters in international politics. The main point of contention is how the practice of 
intervention, which violates state sovereignty, fits within the norm of non-intervention as 
enshrined in the UN Charter under Articles 2.1, 2.4 and 2.7. Article 2.1 of the UN Charter 
states “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
Members”,2 Article 2.4 of the UN Charter states “All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes 
of the United Nations”,3 while Article 2.7 states “nothing contained in the present Charter 
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present Charter: but this principle shall not prejudice the application 
of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”4  
 
The concept of non-intervention has been reinforced by the UN General Assembly 
on a number of occasions, most notably in 1965 and 1970. In 1965 the UN General 
Assembly adopted the ‘Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic 
Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty’. The declaration 
states “no state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in 
the internal or external affairs of any other state” and “no state shall organise, assist, 
                                                          
2
 United Nations Charter, http://www.un.org/en/Documents/charter/chapter1.shtml. 
3
 Ibid.  
4
 Ibid. 
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foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed toward 
violent overthrow of another state, or interfere in civil strife in another state.”5 In 1970 the 
UN General Assembly approved the ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning friendly Relations and Cooperation’. This declaration states that “Every State has 
the duty to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.”6 Despite the concept of state 
sovereignty and non-intervention being a cornerstone of the UN Charter, interventions are 
an almost ubiquitous feature of international relations.  
 
Interventions generally reflect the structural inequalities of the international system. 
Interventions are primarily undertaken by the powerful states of the Global North, while the 
target states of interventions tend to be from the Global South, or states that are 
marginalised from international society. This is due to the power discrepancy between 
strong and weak states that creates the ability for the more powerful states to coerce and 
manipulate those states less powerful than themselves.  Hedley Bull argued that a basic 
condition of an intervention is that the intervener is superior in power to the target state, 
and that a defining feature of being a ‘great power’ was that it could not be intervened 
against.7 For this reason many states in the Global South view intervention, even on 
humanitarian grounds, as a means of neo-colonialism. These states also fear a return of the 
‘standard of civilisation’ argument that was utilised by European states during the 
                                                          
5
 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their 
Independence and Sovereignty’, www.un-documents.net/a20r2131.htm.     
6
 ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning friendly Relations and Cooperation’, www.un-
documents.net/a25r2625.htm.  
7
 Bull, Hedley. ‘Introduction’, Intervention in World Politics, ed, Bull, Hedley. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984. 
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nineteenth century to assign an inferior judicial status to non-European states. In contrast 
those states within the ‘family of nations’ were largely immune from intervention.8 This 
feeling is particularly evident in debates surrounding the ‘right to intervene’ under the 
‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine.9 
 
Although interventions have always been part of the international political system, 
the idea that an intervention is different from war is a relatively new concept. Prior to the 
late nineteenth century, interventions were generally included within wider debates on war. 
The justifications for what may be described as an intervention today, especially 
humanitarian interventions, were debated within the broader spectrum of the ‘just war’ 
theory.10 An example is the seventeenth century Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius who advocated a 
form of humanitarian intervention in his book De Jure Belli ac Pacis, but considered this as a 
just reason for waging war. Grotius argued that sovereigns had the right to punish other 
sovereigns who “excessively violate the law of nature or of nations in regard to any persons 
whatsoever.”11 This extended to punishing the actions that a sovereign commits against its 
own citizens so long as the offending was “very atrocious and very evident”,12 and that 
“while subjects had no right to take up arms against their sovereign...another sovereign 
could take up arms on their behalf.”13 In today’s language such an action would constitute 
an intervention on humanitarian grounds and would not be considered war. However, 
                                                          
8
 MacMillan, John. ‘Intervention and the Ordering of the Modern World’, Review of International Studies, 39:5, 
pp. 1046. 
9
 Focarelli, Carlo, ‘The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and Humanitarian Intervention: Too Many 
Ambiguities for a Working Doctrine’, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 2008, 13:2, pp 202. 
10
 Lawson, George. and. Tardelli, Luca. ‘The Past, Present, and Future of Intervention’, Review of International 
Studies, 39:5, pp. 1236. 
11
 Nardin, Terry, ‘Policy Brief: The Moral Basis of Humanitarian Intervention’, Ethics and International Affairs, 
16:1, pp. 62. 
12
 Ibid.  
13
 Keene, Edward. ‘International Hierarchy and the Origins of the Modern Practice of Intervention’, Review of 
International Studies, 39:5, pp. 1080. 
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Grotius did not make any distinction between war and intervention. There is no phrase or 
word that translates into ‘intervention’ in De Jure Belli ac Pacis,14 while Grotius excluded the 
idea of intervention citing that between war and peace there is no medium.15 It is only since 
the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century that writers and policy makers start 
to differentiate between war and intervention. 
 
While intervention is often understood or described as being different from war, the 
reality is that intervention is situated in a large grey area between war and peace. A feature 
of intervention, that may differentiate it from war, is that an intervention does not usually 
include territorial conquest. Interventions are usually viewed as being smaller in scale with 
smaller goals than war.  States also do not generally declare war when intervening in 
another state. However, the scale of an intervention and the lack of a formal declaration of 
war are not necessarily enough to differentiate war from intervention. Martha Finnemore 
argues that as territorial conquest is rare in today’s international society, and that many 
interventions involve occupation for a period of time or the replacement of entire 
governments, the difference between intervention and war in today’s society is limited.16 
Lawson and Tardelli argue that war disregards sovereignty entirely, while intervention 
qualifies or temporarily suspends sovereignty.17 In this respect the intervener has no 
intention of conquering the target state; rather the aim is to change the actions of the 
target state’s government. However, if a defining feature of state sovereignty is that the 
state has a near monopoly over the use of force and violence within a defined territory, any 
                                                          
14
 Keene, pp. 1080. 
15
 Ibid. 
16
 Finnemore, Martha. The Purpose of Intervention, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 2003, pp. 9. 
17
 Lawson, and. Tardelli. pp. 1236. 
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use of force, or the threat of the use of force is a direct challenge to that state’s sovereignty 
and to the norm of non-intervention.18   
 
If war is different to intervention what are the characteristics that define 
intervention? The Oxford Paperback Dictionary defines the word ‘intervene’ as “[to] enter a 
discussion or dispute etc. in order to change its course or resolve it.”19 While the dictionary 
definition provides an understanding of the word, we cannot rely on this definition as a 
means to guide discussion. Any definition of intervention has to be broad enough to capture 
and identify the actions that are regarded as an intervention but narrow enough to exclude 
the many actions that would ordinarily constitute foreign policy. To use the dictionary 
definition of the word ‘intervene’ would encapsulate too many actions that are simply 
foreign policy, that is to attempt to influence other states to do what you want, or act in 
manner that is favourable to you. 
 
An early definition of intervention was provided by James Rosenau in the 1960’s. 
Rosenau argued that interventions by nature are temporary and finite, and that an 
intervention contained two essential characteristics that differentiated it from other forms 
of foreign policy. These were the convention breaking nature of the action and the targeting 
of authority.20 The first characteristic, convention breaking, was that the action had to 
constitute a sharp break from the normal state of relations between the intervening state/s 
and the target state. The sharp break of relations indicated the start of the intervention, 
while an intervention was considered to have ended once the relations between the 
                                                          
18
 Finnemore, Martha. The Purpose of Intervention, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 2003, pp. 7. 
19
 The Oxford Paperback Dictionary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 4
th
 edition, 1994, pp. 419. 
20
 Rosenau, James, N. ‘The Concept of Intervention’, Journal of International Affairs, 22:2, pp. 167. 
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belligerents returned to the pre-intervention conventions, or that the intervening behaviour 
itself became the accepted norm of behaviour.  Therefore, over time, persistent behaviour 
can establish its own legitimacy despite the manner in which it may have originated.21  
 
The second characteristic that Rosenau argued had to be present for an action to be 
defined as an intervention was that the convention breaking behaviour had to be aimed at 
the authority structures of the target state.22 Breaks in conventional behaviour, such as a 
new trade regime, that did not target the political authority of a state could not be 
considered as an intervention.  Rosenau argued that to be defined as an intervention both 
the convention breaking and targeting of authority had to be present. Rosenau emphasised 
that interventions did not necessarily have to take the form of using military force, but that 
the use of military force and the violation of another state’s sovereignty is often the clearest 
example of convention breaking behaviour.23 
 
The violation of a state’s sovereignty indicates that coercion is a key factor in most 
interventions. If a state consents to outside intervention in its domestic affairs, it is 
effectively relinquishing some or all of its sovereignty for a period of time. For the consent 
to be considered legitimate it must originate from the legally recognised government.24 
However, during a civil war the task of ascertaining the legitimate government can be 
fraught, as the complexity of sovereignty and governance becomes increasingly opaque. Not 
only are there often competing claims to be the legitimate government, but there is often 
                                                          
21
 Rosenau. pp. 167. 
22
 Ibid. pp. 169. 
23
 Ibid, pp. 168. 
24
 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, ‘Research, Bibliography, Supplementary 
Volume to The Responsibility to Protect’, Ottawa, International Development Research Centre, 2001, pp. 16. 
15 
 
increased influence exerted by non-state actors, or militias with their own agendas. The 
question then arises, does the government, or group that provides the consent for the 
intervention actually represent the population in the target area? This matter is further 
complicated if the intervention occurs in a failed state with no government. Consent may 
also be granted by the legitimate government as a result of external pressure or coercion 
placed upon the government.25 This could constitute consent under duress and therefore 
not be representative of the actual motives of the government. A government may also 
request outside intervention, especially in humanitarian cases, as a means to maintain its 
credibility with the international community and its own domestic constituencies, thereby 
ensuring its own survival.   
 
Oran Young defines intervention as “any action taken by an actor that is not directly 
party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or remove one or more of the problems of the 
bargaining relationship and, therefore, to facilitate the termination of the crisis itself.”26 
While this definition is useful, it encompasses too many actions that constitute foreign 
affairs or interference rather than intervention. For example, direct foreign investment or 
politicians commenting on events in another state could be interpreted as being an 
intervention. This is problematic in today’s interconnected world where even relatively 
isolated regimes are interwoven into the international community.  
 
                                                          
25
 Voon, Tania.’Closing the Gap between Legitimacy and Legality of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons From 
East Timor and Kosovo’, UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs, 2003-2003, pp. 35-36. 
26
 Jean-Sebastian Rioux, ‘Third Party Interventions in International Conflicts: Theory and Evidence’, paper at 
the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Halifax: Nova Scotia, 30 May – 1 June 2003, 
pp. 6. 
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M.C. Pugh offers a narrower definition of intervention than Oran Young, which 
focuses on the use of military force. Pugh defines intervention as “a dramatic, abnormal, 
change in relations between states, in which the jurisdictional boundaries are crossed by 
interveners using military force to achieve political goals that fall short of all-out war, naked 
conquest and annexation. It protects statism but seeks changes in government policy.”27 
Pugh’s definition utilises the concepts developed by Rosenau but focuses the attention of an 
intervention solely on military force. This helps clarify the definition and eliminates actions 
that could be considered as normal forms of foreign policy. Pugh’s definition also provides a 
very clear indication of when an intervention has occurred, and focuses on the violation of 
another state’s sovereignty. To focus the rest of the essay we will use the definition that 
Pugh provides focusing on the use of military force. 
 
Despite their coercive nature and ability to amount to ‘structural violence’ 
diplomatic and economic activities are excluded from the definition for the following 
reasons. First, many of the actions that could be defined as diplomatic intervention simply 
fall under the general category of foreign policy, that is, to try and make another state do 
what you want them to do.28 To include them would provide a definition that is too 
unwieldy and cumbersome. Second, diplomatic efforts to resolve a crisis or modify the 
behaviour of another state do not carry the same political and economic risks as a military 
intervention.29 Military interventions are generally more controversial, visible, and costly in 
both economic and political terms. In comparison to diplomatic interventions, the additional 
                                                          
27
 Pugh, M C. ‘International Intervention’, in UNESCO, Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems. Section 2.3. 
28
 Hoffman, Stanley. ‘The Problem of Intervention’, Intervention in World Politics, ed, Bull, Hedley. Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1984. pp. 9. 
29
 Regan, Patrick. ‘Choosing to Intervene: Outside Intervention in Internal Conflicts’, The Journal of Politics, 
60:3, pp. 757. 
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costs and risks associated with military intervention create a different set of criteria on 
which the decision-making calculus is based.  The potential fallout and loss of reputation are 
generally less when intervening diplomatically. It is also more difficult to withdraw from a 
military intervention than it is to extricate oneself from a diplomatic intervention or 
interference. Thirdly, diplomatic interventions are often targeted at maintaining the status 
quo.30 Although interventions using military force can also be used to maintain the status 
quo, they usually aim to materially change the circumstances on the ground. The sharp 
break from normality that military interventions represent is also a key differentiating factor 
between diplomatic interventions and interventions using military force. Fourth, unless 
there is significant time pressure to act, diplomatic and/or economic interventions usually 
occur before states resort to a more visible, costly and destructive military intervention.31 
The use of military personnel for disaster relief operations is also not included in the 
definition of intervention. This is because the armed forces are being used for their logistical 
and technical skills, not their fighting capabilities. They are normally deployed only after a 
request from the effected state and are not deployed to change the politics or behaviour of 
the target state.  
 
One problem with the definition of intervention based on the use of force is where 
the use of clandestine operations fits within the definition? The support of rebels, through 
training or financial aid, or the use of a proxy to fight your battles could have a significant 
effect in the target state. However, the intervening state could exercise plausible deniability 
and argue that their actions do not break the principle of non-intervention as their forces 
have not breached the sovereign territory of the target state.  This essentially blurs the lines 
                                                          
30
 Regan. pp. 757. 
31
 Pugh. Section 2.2. 
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of intervention and while a good argument could be made that clandestine operations 
should be included in a definition of intervention, it is often difficult to prove any 
allegations. As this essay will assess New Zealand’s motivations for involvement in 
interventions, and New Zealand is not known for its clandestine operations it is unnecessary 
to include clandestine operations in the definition. 
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Chapter Two: International Relations Theory and 
Intervention 
 
The reasons and motivations why states choose to intervene in other states are as 
numerous as the number of interventions. For example, states may choose to intervene to 
advance their own economic or strategic interests,32 to protect civilians from egregious 
human rights abuses,33 to prevent refugees from a neighbouring civil war flowing into their 
territory, to uphold international security and stability, or to support international norms. 
Other factors such as state identity and the perception each state has of its role and position 
in international politics may also influence the decision to participate in an intervention.34 
Despite the wide range of reasons a state may choose a policy of intervention, the decision 
can usually be explained by one of the main theories of international relations. This does not 
mean that all interventions fall neatly into one theory or another, but that the dominant 
thinking can be best explained using one paradigm.  The next section will briefly outline 
each of the three main theories in international relations – realism, liberalism, and 
constructivism – and how each theory can explain the motivations for why states choose to 
intervene in another state. 
 
Before addressing the theoretical perspective of why states choose to intervene it is 
worth noting that states will usually only intervene when certain conditions are met, 
regardless of whether the rationale for intervening is based in realist, liberal, or 
constructivist thinking. Not all of the following conditions have to be present, but it is 
                                                          
32
 Morgenthau, Hans J. ‘To Intervene or not to Intervene’, Foreign Affairs, April 1967, 45, pp. 425-436. 
33
 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, 
International Development Research Centre, 2001. 
34
 Finnemore, Martha. ‘Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention’, The Culture of National Security, ed. 
Katzenstein, Peter J, Columbia University Press, New York, 1996. pp. 153-185. 
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reasonable to assume that at least one of the following conditions would be present in the 
decision to intervene militarily in another state.  
 
The first condition is that there must be a reasonable chance of success in achieving 
the goals of the intervention.35 It is highly unlikely that any state would embark on a policy 
of intervention if there was a high, or even moderate, probability of failure from the outset. 
The human, political and material costs of a failed intervention could have a significant 
impact on any government or state. Governments could be voted out of office, the cost of 
the intervention could contribute to economic recession, or the reputational damage could 
impact a state’s ability to function as effectively as possible on the international stage. A 
failed intervention can also influence the discourse on intervention and have consequences 
for any future interventions. This can most readily be seen in the deliberations in the United 
States about intervening in Bosnia and Rwanda, where the failed intervention in Somalia 
loomed over the decision making process.36 This was despite the humanitarian situation 
being worse in both Rwanda and Bosnia than it was in Somalia. 
 
The second condition is that the proposed timeframe for completion of an 
intervention would normally be short.37 Decision makers will generally steer away from any 
intervention if an extended engagement is likely. The longer an intervention continues, the 
more the material and political costs for the government increase, while the benefits would 
either remain the same or decrease.  
 
                                                          
35
 Regan. pp. 757. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Ibid. 
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The third condition is the presence of clear goals. Having a clear goal is important to 
ensure a short time frame and assist the intervener in not being dragged into a larger 
conflagration, or into areas such as state building that were not the original intention of the 
intervention. History is replete with longwinded interventions that suffered greatly from 
mission creep. However, once an intervention has commenced the goals may become more 
fluid in response to changing events on the ground. This does not necessarily mean that the 
original decision to intervene did not have a clear goal, rather that the goals can change 
over time. 
 
The fourth condition is that there is a degree of domestic and or international 
support for the intervention.38 Without domestic support the constituency costs could 
outweigh the potential benefits of the intervention. While the political costs on the 
international stage for an intervention with no international support could be significant for 
the intervener. 
 
Realism 
 
Realism depicts international relations as a nasty environment where states struggle 
for survival in an anarchic world, and conflict between states is inevitable. Although realism 
is not a unified theory and has many different strands, the key concept of realism is the 
attainment of power, both militarily and economic, by states. In the absence of an 
overarching governing body in international society each state strives to maximise its own 
power relative to other actors to ensure its own survival. As each state acts in a self-
                                                          
38
 Regan. pp. 758. 
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interested and selfish manner, realism is generally pessimistic about the prospects of peace 
in the international system. Structural realists, like Kenneth Waltz, focus on the structure of 
the international system that forces states to act in a selfish manner.39 Due to the perceived 
constraints of the international system, realists view state interests as relatively static and 
that all states have the same primary goal – survival. Because states have the same goal, 
realism views states as undifferentiated actors who will act in a similar manner depending 
on their power capabilities.  Realist theory also views the international environment as 
largely devoid of any cultural aspects, for this reason realists focus on material concepts 
such as power.40 
 
The realist perception of international politics asserts that international cooperation 
is difficult to develop and is generally pessimistic about the chances of successful 
cooperation. Cooperation is further diminished in areas that are vital to a state’s survival 
such as security cooperation.41 Realists argue that international institutions cannot 
substantially affect the international system and that they are secondary to the power 
distributions within the system. Furthermore, international institutions are designed to help 
the interests of the most powerful states, who only abide by the rules and international 
norms when it suits them. This decreases the efficacy of these institutions and reduces the 
role that small states can play in international politics. It is argued that the norms and ideas 
                                                          
39
 Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of International Politics,  Addison-Wesley, Reading, 1979. 
40
 Katzenstein, Peter J. The Culture of National Security, Columbia University Press, New York, 1996. pp. 33. 
41
 Kang, Taek Goo. ‘Assessing China’s approach to regional multilateral security cooperation’, Australian 
Journal of International Affairs’, 64:4. pp. 408. 
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of less powerful states cannot change the nature of the international system, because they 
do not have enough power to impact any change.42  
 
From a realist perspective, states would only choose to intervene in another state if 
their key state interests were at risk, or if intervention would further their state power and 
security. Hans Morgenthau argued that a state should only intervene when its interests are 
at stake and only when there is a reasonable chance of success. Morgenthau stated that “all 
nations will continue to be guided in their decisions to intervene and their choice of means 
of intervention by what they regard as their respective national interests.”43 Morgenthau 
argued that states should not intervene based on ideological grounds or reasons other than 
state interests, as intervening on ideological grounds reduces the chances for a successful 
intervention. Morgenthau pointed out that during the Cold War the United States 
intervened regularly, but often with little success. Conversely, if a state only intervened 
when its national interests were at stake then it would intervene less often but with more 
success.44 From a realist perspective an intervention could also be prompted by a rival state 
intervening in another state, or the perception that a rival may intervene in another state.45  
In this scenario a state would be acting to prevent a rival state from gaining an advantage or 
to disrupt the rival’s intervention. 
 
One major limitation with the realist view of international relations and intervention 
is that realism does not adequately explain humanitarian intervention or peace keeping 
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missions. While some interventions may be motivated by power and state interests, the 
majority of humanitarian interventions take place in states that offer little strategic or 
economic interest to the intervening state/s. The fact that intervening states expend large 
amounts of material and human resources, and risk significant political fallout if the 
intervention fails, for very little in the way of increasing their own state’s interests indicates 
that states do not always act in the selfish manner prescribed by the realist paradigm.  
 
Liberalism  
 
Liberalism, like realism, views conflict as inherent in the international system but, 
unlike realism, views states as rational actors and identifies several ways to mitigate the 
conflictive nature of international politics.46 Liberalism asserts that international peace and 
stability can be best achieved through the promotion of international law, increased 
economic interdependency, international organisations and the spread of democracy. The 
expansion of human rights, the rule of law and the self-determination of the world’s people 
are also key ideals of liberalism.  By focusing on the possibility of cooperation between 
states liberalism is more optimistic about the chances of peace and security in international 
politics than realism. 
 
Liberalism argues that the more common interests that exist between states the 
greater the possibility of cooperation and stability in international politics. For example, 
increased economic interdependency will reduce the likelihood of conflict, as conflict would 
threaten the economic prosperity of the states involved. As international economic 
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interdependency deepens, a conflict may also affect other states not directly party to the 
conflict. For this reason the international community may cooperate to actively defuse any 
conflict before it can impact the wider prosperity of the international community. Liberalism 
focuses on the idea that cooperation can be garnered through international organisations, 
such as the UN and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These multilateral organisations 
can encourage states to sacrifice short term gains for the longer term benefits provided by 
ongoing cooperation and the stability this brings.47  Liberalism also argues that international 
security can be best developed through ‘common security’. ‘Common security’ is the idea 
that cooperation, rather than competition, between states provides the best form of 
security in international relations.48 This contrasts to the realist idea that states will secure 
their security individually or through ‘collective security’, where states combine forces in 
alliances to produce a deterrent threat greater than their individual capabilities. 
 
The spread of democracy and the ‘democratic peace theory’ are also key tenets of 
liberalism.  The ‘democratic peace theory’ is based upon the assumption that democratic 
states are less prone to conflict than non-democratic states or authoritarian states.49 The 
theory holds that liberal democracies do not fight each other, therefore the spread of liberal 
ideals such as the free market and democracy will mitigate the risk of conflict in the 
international system. This is despite the fact that research has shown that states that are 
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transitioning to democracy often have a higher chance of conflict than authoritarian or non-
democratic regimes.50 
 
In contrast to realism, where a decision to intervene would be primarily based on 
furthering state interests, liberal interventions may be motivated by factors that do not 
advance a state’s direct material interests. This does not mean that state interests do not 
enter into the decision making calculus, but that short term state interests may not be the 
overriding factor.  
 
Liberal interventions are often humanitarian in nature, with the aim to protect 
vulnerable groups from egregious harm committed by their government or warring factions 
of a civil war. Since the end of the Cold War the international community has launched a 
number of interventions ostensibly based on humanitarian grounds. The fact that these 
interventions often take place in states of little strategic or economic importance indicates 
that the intervening states are not motivated by furthering or protecting their state 
interests. Interventions on liberal grounds may also focus on state building and the 
development of liberal ideals such as the free market and democracy.  
 
Constructivism 
 
The constructivist paradigm views international relations through a sociological lens. 
Unlike realism and liberalism that are essentialist in their international relations outlook, 
constructivism is a contingent view, in that international society is how states construct it. 
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Constructivism places importance on ideas, norms, values and identity. Constructivism does 
not dismiss material factors such as power in explaining state behaviour, but has found the 
focus on material factors to be inadequate to properly assess the reasons for state 
behaviour.51 Constructivist theory views states as social actors who through interactions 
with other states develop shared norms, ideas, and possibly shared identities. Peter 
Katzenstein defines a norm as the “collective expectations for the proper behaviour of 
actors within a given identity.”52 The normative context of international society helps shape 
the interests and actions of states, and assists in making dissimilar states act in a similar 
fashion.53 In this respect state behaviour is driven, to a certain extent, by adherence to 
international norms or laws not solely based on a cost benefit analysis of each and every 
situation. Busse argues that we do not stop and make calculations for every decision to 
ascertain the most beneficial course of action. Instead we generally adhere to the dominant 
social and cultural norms of the time.54 As ideas, debates, identities and norms change over 
time constructivist theory views the international order as more fluid than either the realism 
or liberalism.  
 
The role of identity and a state’s self conception is a key aspect of constructivism. A 
state’s identity and self conception play a significant role in determining the manner in 
which a state behaves, and can direct the decision making process of the elites in each state. 
Bulent Aras and Aylin Gorener define national role conceptions as “policy makers’ 
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understanding of what their nation stands for in the international arena. They are the 
sources of norms and standards that pattern government actions and responses under 
different circumstances.”55 The foreign policy preferences of states can often be linked back 
to the political, cultural and personal experiences and characteristics of the elites in the 
formative stages of the state. These experiences and characteristics may help shape and 
define the foreign policy approach each state adopts. Self conception and identity reflect 
what a state believes in and what it is willing to stand up for.  For example, if a state views 
itself as being an active member of the international community and has historically 
participated in international interventions to protect human rights they may feel more 
obliged to participate in any future intervention than a state that does not have the same 
history. A state’s self conception is also reflected by the way other states perceive that 
state. Other states will expect certain states to behave in a particular manner based on 
historical patterns. In this regard the historical context of each state may be a significant 
influence on any decision to intervene or not. 
 
Constructivism argues that while some interventions can be best explained through 
a realist or liberal internationalist paradigm, neither perspective provides a satisfactory 
explanation for interventions on humanitarian grounds. Like liberalism, constructivism 
argues that many interventions occur in states that offer very little strategically or 
economically to the intervening states. Interventions also take place where the intervening 
parties do not attempt to construct a liberal democracy in the target state. An example 
often provided in the literature, where realist or liberal arguments cannot reconcile with the 
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actions of the intervening states, is the United States led intervention in Somalia in 1992.56 
At the time, Somalia was a failing state that offered little to no geostrategic or economic 
interest to the intervening states. The intervention did not aim to create a liberal democracy 
or market but was launched based on humanitarian grounds. While this is only one 
example, the international community has intervened on humanitarian grounds numerous 
times since the end of the Cold War. 
 
From a constructivist point of view the decision to intervene can be attributed to the 
international norms surrounding intervention. As norms influence state behaviour, changing 
attitudes towards intervention have had an impact on decision makers and their choices to 
commit military forces to interventions. States now intervene in circumstances when 
previously they would not have intervened. They also do not intervene when they 
previously would have. For example, until the early twentieth century intervention to collect 
outstanding debts was considered an acceptable practice in international society57 but 
intervening on humanitarian grounds was not considered a norm. The increased willingness 
to intervene when a state cannot or is unwilling to protect its citizens reflects a change in 
international norms and expectations surrounding state behaviour and intervention. This 
emerging norm is best encapsulated by the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine that was 
formulated in 2001 and accepted by the international community at the World Summit in 
2005.58   
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Chapter Three: New Zealand’s Interventions within 
the Asia-Pacific Region 
 
East Timor 
 
The former Portuguese colony of East Timor was invaded by Indonesia in December 
1975. The invading Indonesian force was brutal, with troops committing massacres and 
killing thousands of unarmed civilians indiscriminately. In July 1976, East Timor was annexed 
as an Indonesian province. However, only Australia officially recognised Indonesian 
sovereignty over East Timor. Over the next 25 years the East Timorese would be subjected 
to harsh Indonesian military rule that would claim the lives of an estimated 200,000 East 
Timorese civilians and resistance fighters.59 This represented around 30 per cent of the East 
Timorese population and has been referred to as genocide. Until 1999 the international 
community did little to help assist the East Timorese, and in some cases facilitated 
Indonesia’s continued presence.  
 
In the late 1990’s Indonesia was badly affected by the Asian Financial Crisis. The 
Asian Financial Crisis was a catalyst for the social unrest that led to the eventual downfall of 
the Suharto regime, and change in Indonesia’s policy towards East Timor. On 9 June 1998, 
Indonesia’s interim President, Dr Bucharuddin Jusuf Habibie, announced that he was willing 
to offer East Timor ‘special status’ while remaining within the sovereignty of Indonesia.60 On 
27 January 1999, President Habibie went further and stated that if the East Timorese voted 
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against greater autonomy within Indonesia he would request that the Indonesian 
government grant East Timor independence.61 
 
Following Habibie’s announcement an agreement was reached between Indonesia, 
the UN, and Portugal to conduct a UN supervised ballot to determine if the East Timorese 
wanted independence or greater autonomy within Indonesia.  An outcome of this 
agreement was that the United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was 
established. The role of UNAMET was to run the referendum on 30 August 1999, while 
Indonesia would remain responsible for maintaining peace and security throughout East 
Timor during the referendum process. This included ensuring the referendum was carried 
out in a fair and peaceful manner, and that there was an absence of violence or 
intimidation. The Indonesian authorities were also responsible to ensure the safety of the 
UN staff, international observers and local referendum staff.62   
 
In the period leading up to the ballot, pro-integration militias received funding and 
support from the Indonesian military, with their numbers swelling to around 25,000.63 The 
pro-integration militias carried out a campaign of intimidation and violence against the pro-
independence movement, civilians, local referendum staff, and the UN. However, the 
violence and campaign of intimidation that had been prevalent in the months leading up to 
the ballot was relatively absent on the day of the referendum. On 4 September 1999, the 
result of the referendum was announced, with 78.5 per cent of voters voting for 
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independence from Indonesia.64 The result of the referendum came as a shock to 
Indonesian officials in Jakarta,65 who had expected that the East Timorese would vote for 
greater autonomy within Indonesia. 
 
The result of the referendum was a trigger for the pro-integration militia groups to 
escalate their campaign of violence. The militia groups went on a rampage, looting and 
burning homes and buildings, and targeting UN officials, journalists and international aid 
workers. Within a few days an estimated 1,000 people had been killed and around one 
quarter of the population had fled their homes.66 Pro-integration militias also attempted to 
‘cleanse’ pro-independence supporters from the western areas of East Timor. The Red Cross 
estimated that on 7 September around 3,000 people were being forcibly relocated across 
the border into West Timor every hour.67 This was seen as an attempt to create a de-facto 
partition of East Timor that could be incorporated into Indonesia at a later date. 
 
Amid the worsening violence the international community was vocal in its 
condemnation of Indonesia and on 5 September the UN Security Council demanded that 
Indonesia restore security to East Timor. In an attempt to placate the international outcry 
Indonesia declared martial law on 7 September, but this did little to halt the human rights 
abuses that were taking place.  Despite the growing international pressure Indonesia 
continued to oppose any peacekeeping force and implied that it would resist any attempt to 
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deploy a UN peacekeeping force.68 As the violence continued the US and New Zealand 
suspended military co-operation with Indonesia, while leaders at the APEC summit in 
Auckland placed diplomatic pressure on Indonesia to halt the violence and consent to an UN 
peacekeeping force. There was also considerable pressure applied on Indonesia from the 
IMF and the World Bank. 
 
In the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis Indonesia was heavily reliant on loans 
from the IMF and the World Bank to maintain stability and a functioning economy. As the 
violence continued the IMF described the events in East Timor as a ‘humanitarian disaster’69 
and indicated to Indonesia that its failure to contain the violence would lead to funds being 
withheld.  The IMF also cancelled a planned mission to Jakarta in September 1999. The 
World Bank indicated its disapproval of Indonesia and froze a $1 billion aid programme to 
Indonesia.70 This economic leverage was a key factor in Indonesia’s decision to consent to a 
UN sanctioned force being deployed to East Timor.  
 
By 12 September the diplomatic and financial pressure exerted on Indonesia led to 
President Habibie consenting to an UN sanctioned peacekeeping force to intervene and 
restore peace and stability to East Timor. Once Indonesia consented to the presence of an 
UN force in East Timor, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1264 on 15 September. 
Resolution 1264 determined that the situation in East Timor was a threat to international 
                                                          
68
 Jago. pp. 384. 
69
 Ibid. pp. 387. 
70
 Wheeler. and Dunne. pp. 820. 
34 
 
peace and security, authorised the deployment of a peacekeeping force to East Timor, and 
authorised the force to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate.71  
 
New Zealand’s decision to intervene in Indonesia is best explained by liberalism and 
New Zealand’s desire to protect human rights and uphold democracy. To a lesser extent the 
decision was influenced by realist and constructivist elements, such as protecting New 
Zealand’s international reputation and its relationship with Australia, and the emerging 
norm of humanitarian intervention and New Zealand’s self conception as a good 
international citizen. However, for New Zealand, a UN mandate was essential before any 
decision would be made to intervene. 
 
UN authorisation was of the utmost importance before the National government 
would consider participating in any intervention. It is unlikely that New Zealand would have 
contributed to any force that did not have a UN mandate, or at the minimum a mandate 
from a regional body with Indonesia’s consent. During the parliamentary debate on East 
Timor on 7 September 1999, Foreign Minister Don McKinnon stated that “no country 
envisages sending forces to East Timor without the consent of the Indonesian Government. 
That would be tantamount to an invasion, and for New Zealand or any other country in the 
region such a proposition is just not a starter.”72 After Indonesia accepted a UN 
peacekeeping force in East Timor Prime Minister Jenny Shipley stated “It appears that 
Indonesia’s decision takes us toward meeting the conditions New Zealand has required all 
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along. We have an Indonesian invitation and broad-based support from the international 
community. Now we await a UN mandate.”73  
 
Realism does not adequately explain New Zealand’s decision to intervene in East 
Timor. If New Zealand felt that its security or national interests were at risk from the 
ongoing violence in East Timor, then it may have intervened to protect its national interests. 
However, neither New Zealand’s security nor its national interests were threatened by the 
ongoing violence in East Timor. While regional security was a concern it is unlikely that it 
was the driving factor behind the decision to intervene. In the press statement announcing 
that New Zealand would deploy troops to East Timor there was no mention of regional 
security,74 and issues of regional security were largely absent from the Parliamentary debate 
on 17 September that debated the commitment of New Zealand Defence Force personnel 
to East Timor.75  
 
From a realist perspective Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor, and the subsequent 
violence, was not a major regional security concern. The situation in East Timor did not 
change the strategic balance of power in the region, and the contagion risk of the conflict 
spreading to other states was minimal. While there was a risk that East Timor could become 
a haven for trans-national crime, such as drugs and arms smuggling, this was unlikely given 
Indonesia’s military and police presence in East Timor. Of greater concern to regional 
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security was that independence for East Timor might lead to the ‘Balkanisation’ of 
Indonesia. Areas such as Irian-Jaya and Aceh were already fighting for independence from 
Jakarta and it was feared that other areas of Indonesia might also push for independence.76 
The creation of a number of new states would have destabilised the region and increased 
the security threat to the region. For this reason it could be argued that maintaining 
Indonesia’s territorial integrity, not supporting an intervention on behalf of the East 
Timorese, would have been the probable realist course of action. 
 
Realism also does not explain why New Zealand risked significant trade links, and 
potential damage to its relationship with Indonesia over a small island with which it had 
little to no economic or state interests. East Timor was too poor and underdeveloped for 
New Zealand to have any trade concerns, or potential economic interests to develop. Even if 
New Zealand did have some economic interests in East Timor, they would have been 
insignificant in comparison to the Indonesian market of over 200 million people.  East Timor 
also required millions of dollars in aid and ongoing assistance from the international 
community to help build the functions of state that had been neglected during the period of 
Indonesian rule.  
 
However, from a realist perspective New Zealand’s decision to intervene in East 
Timor was partially motivated by the desire to be seen as a credible and reliable ally to 
Australia,77 and a regional partner that would contribute to regional security when required.  
The relationship with Australia is New Zealand’s most important security and trade 
relationship.  After the dissolution of the ANZUS Treaty the security aspects of this 
                                                          
76
 Cottrill, Ross. ‘East Timor in Context’, New Zealand International Review, 24:4, pp. 8. 
77
 Crawford. and Harper. pp. 51-52. 
37 
 
relationship became more important for New Zealand. Australia argued that New Zealand 
should contribute to any force that would be deployed to East Timor and kept New Zealand 
informed about the advanced planning it had developed in the event a deployment had to 
be made. In the paper submitted to Cabinet on 16 September 1999, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade and the Minister of Defence argued that “To be internationally and 
domestically credible, a NZDF contribution needs to be of a significant size.....It would also 
be an appropriate contribution in the context of Closer Defence Relations with its emphasis 
on each country taking a fair share of the security burden.”78 Declining to participate in the 
intervention in East Timor, or sending a token force, would have placed considerable strain 
on the relationship with Australia. While this demonstrates that realist factors were at play 
it is unlikely that they were the main motivating factor behind the decision to deploy troops 
to East Timor. 
 
The decision to intervene in East Timor was primarily motivated by the liberal ideals 
of protecting human rights and upholding the democratic rights of the East Timorese. For a 
number of years New Zealand had been concerned about the ongoing violence in East 
Timor. This concern was heightened after a five member cross party delegation returned 
from East Timor and reported their findings to Parliament in September 1999.79 After the 
referendum in East Timor it was apparent that, despite being capable, Indonesia was not 
abiding by its responsibility to maintain peace and stability in East Timor as agreed with the 
UN. It was also evident that the Indonesian armed forces were unwilling to stop the human 
rights abuses, and were aiding the militia groups in their activities.  
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Prime Minister Jenny Shipley made it clear that New Zealand was appalled by the 
human rights violations that were taking place, and stated that making a commitment to 
support the human rights and aspirations of the people of East Timor was ‘absolutely the 
right thing to do’.80 Minister of Defence Max Bradford also affirmed New Zealand’s 
commitment to human rights and stated that “[Indonesia] cannot be a peaceful player in 
the region with internal insecurity that spills over to us in a variety of ways, whether that be 
in terms of refugees, of internal civil strife, or, most important for this house, of a lack of 
respect for the human rights that we believe to be right and that the world believes to be 
right.”81 Throughout the Parliamentary debate on the deployment of forces to East Timor 
the most common theme was that New Zealand should intervene to protect the human 
rights of the East Timorese.82  
 
The protection of human rights also extended to upholding the democratic rights of 
the East Timorese after they voted for independence from Indonesia. The New Zealand 
government believed that the democratic rights of the East Timorese should not be 
impeded by Indonesian intimidation and violence. Jenny Shipley stated that “the rapid 
deployment of a capable force of New Zealand men and women underlines New Zealand’s 
firm willingness to ensure the expressed will of the East Timorese people is realised” 83 and 
“for freedom is a delicate and fragile thing, and New Zealand must do what it can to retain 
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the desire and the ability to defend freedom where that is necessary.”84 As the referendum 
was held legitimately, it was felt that Indonesia should abide by its international obligations 
and grant the East Timorese their independence. For New Zealand, respect for human rights 
and democracy are rights that should be afforded to all people, and are ideals that are 
worth defending when possible. 
 
The decision to intervene may have also been influenced by a desire to atone for 
New Zealand’s past negligence towards Indonesian human rights abuses in East Timor. In 
2002 the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Phil Goff stated “New Zealand cannot alter what 
happened in 1975. It has at least provided some compensation for its silence then by the 
substantial assistance provided since 1999 in our peacekeeping efforts and in development 
assistance and diplomatic support.”85 New Zealand never officially recognised Indonesia’s 
annexation of East Timor but it did describe East Timor’s incorporation into Indonesia as 
“irreversible”.86 While New Zealand did not condone Indonesia’s actions in East Timor, it 
was not vocal in its opposition preferring to use ‘quiet diplomacy’ over ‘megaphone 
diplomacy’.87 After the UN Security Council passed Resolution 389 in 1976, that called for 
Indonesia to ‘withdraw without further delay all its forces from the territory’,88 New Zealand 
abstained from the General Assembly vote rather than risk its relationship with Indonesia. 
This was the first of many instances where New Zealand would vote against or abstain from 
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votes regarding East Timor. To some this was seen as tacit support of Indonesia’s policy 
towards East Timor.89  
 
Successive governments from both sides of the political spectrum had chosen to 
place realist concerns about trade and regional security above New Zealand’s idealism and 
moral principles. A memorandum from the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Prime 
Minister dated 10 December 1975, just days after the invasion of East Timor,  stated that 
“New Zealand has a strong interest in maintaining good relations with Indonesia even if this 
might on occasion require some measure of compromise on matters of principle.”90 While 
the advice given to the incoming Labour government in 1984 regarding East Timor was “The 
crux of the problem of East Timor is to reconcile New Zealand’s opposition to the 
incorporation of East Timor by force, the subsequent human rights violations and 
repugnance at the sometimes brutal methods of the Indonesian army with the very 
considerable national interest in maintaining good relations with Indonesia, unquestionably 
the single most important country in South East Asia.”91 
 
From a constructivist perspective the decision to intervene was influenced by the 
emerging norm of humanitarian intervention, the international community’s failure to 
intervene in Rwanda and Srebrenica, and the NATO led humanitarian intervention in 
Kosovo. The failure to intervene in Rwanda was especially poignant for New Zealand, which 
was a member of the UN Security Council during the Rwandan genocide. New Zealand was 
one of the only states to advocate for a greater UN involvement during the Rwandan crisis, 
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but was unable persuade other Security Council members to intervene.92 This experience 
galvanised New Zealand to prevent egregious human rights abuses or genocide where 
possible, and certainly within its own region. While the NATO intervention was an example 
of an emerging norm among some states to intervene on humanitarian grounds. Jenny 
Shipley referred to East Timor as our region’s Kosovo.93 By linking the Kosovo intervention 
to East Timor Shipley was using an example of a recent humanitarian intervention to gain 
support and acceptance for New Zealand’s decision to intervene in East Timor. This also 
demonstrated that New Zealand would not just talk about the necessity of humanitarian 
intervention but would take action when it was required within its region. In this way New 
Zealand was contributing to the development of the norm of humanitarian intervention 
where a state will not protect its own citizens.  
 
The emerging norm of humanitarian intervention may have been an influencing 
factor. However, it is more likely that it was an enabling factor rather than the reason for 
the intervention itself. The rise of the norm of humanitarian intervention created an 
international environment where interventions on humanitarian grounds were more 
permissible than during the 1970’s and the Cold War. As humanitarian intervention was 
more acceptable New Zealand could contribute to alleviate the human rights abuses it had 
been concerned about since the 1970’s. The dominant paradigm during the Cold War, 
realism, previously prevented any intervention on humanitarian grounds in East Timor.  
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Constructivism does help explain the role that New Zealand’s national identity 
played in the decision to intervene in East Timor. The decision to intervene in East Timor 
could be seen as an extension of New Zealand’s self conception as a state that is inclined to 
assist in the development of, and the protection of human rights. In announcing that New 
Zealand would send troops to East Timor Jenny Shipley stated that “The deployment of 
troops to East Timor will see New Zealanders once again taking up the baton to help those 
in need, and to safeguard the democratic process, human rights and freedom”. Shipley 
made similar announcements prior to the decision to intervene being announced. On 13 
September 1999, Shipley stated that “New Zealanders have shown repeatedly in the past 
that they are prepared to take a stand for what is right. This is a time for New Zealanders to 
show that same determination once again.”94, and on 15 September 1999 Shipley stated 
“New Zealanders have a proud tradition of standing up for what is right...It is time for New 
Zealanders to invoke that tradition again.”95 It was not only the Prime Minister that invoked 
New Zealand’s tradition and identity. During the debate held on 17 September 1999, many 
speakers from both sides of the house referred to New Zealand’s tradition and supported 
the deployment of troops to protect human rights again.96 
 
There was also considerable public support for a New Zealand contribution to a 
peacekeeping force in East Timor. Public support and awareness of the plight of the East 
Timorese people had been growing since the early 1990’s, especially after the Dili massacre 
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in 1991 where 271 people were killed, 278 wounded and 270 ‘disappeared’.97 The public 
support was reflected by the multi-party support for the deployment of troops to East 
Timor. In the special debate held on 17 September 1999, all parties, including the usually 
pacifist Alliance Party, supported the deployment of troops. A number of speakers, including 
the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, cited public support for the 
deployment of troops to assist with the UN mission. Prime Minister Jenny Shipley stated 
that “The overwhelming number of New Zealanders believe we should uphold international 
peace, security and democracy.”98 The wide spread public support for the intervention was 
reflected in two opinion polls conducted in late September 1999. One poll found that 60 per 
cent of people approved of the deployment to East Timor, while the other found that 80 per 
cent of people approved of the decision to support the UN peacekeeping mission.99  
 
Solomon Islands 
 
The Solomon Islands is an archipelago of over 1,000 islands situated north east of 
Australia. It has a population of half a million people inhabiting six main islands and is 
ethnically diverse, with around 80 languages spoken.100 While the most populous island is 
Malaita, the capital city, Honiara, is located on the island of Guadalcanal. The Solomon 
Islands is one of the poorest states in the world with few natural resources or economic 
opportunities for its citizens. In 1978, the Solomon Islands was granted independence from 
Britain but had few properly formed functions of state and was ill prepared to govern alone. 
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For example, at the time of independence there were only 17 university graduates in the 
Solomon Islands.101 The neglect by the British colonial administration and its failure to 
develop a ‘national identity’ to unify the ethnically diverse population would contribute to 
the ethnic tensions and conflict that would blight the Solomon Islands in the late 1990’s and 
early 2000’s. 
 
In 1998 tensions between the two largest ethnic groups, the Guadalcanalese and the 
Malaitans, began to increase on the island of Guadalcanal. The Guadalcanalese resented the 
migration of Malaitans to Guadalcanal since the end of the Second World War. A large 
number of Guadalcanalese believed that the Malaitans had become too dominant in 
Guadalcanal, taking over traditional Guadalcanal lands and controlling the local economy 
and government. As tensions grew the Guadalcanalese formed militia groups and began to 
clash with the settler Malaitans. The largest militia group, the Guadalcanal Revolutionary 
Army (GRA) later known as the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM), embarked on a campaign 
of violence and ethnically cleansed an estimated 35,000 Malaitans from the rural areas 
surrounding Honiara.102 In response, the Malaitans formed a rival militia group, the Malaita 
Eagle Force (MEF), to help protect the Malaitans on Guadalcanal.  
 
The MEF had close ties with the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force, and when Prime 
Minister Ulufa’ulu declined to pay compensation to the Malaitans displaced by the IFM, the 
MEF raided the police armoury and staged a coup on 5 June 2000 overthrowing the 
government of Ulufa’ulu. As the fighting escalated between the MEF and the IFM the new 
Prime Minister, Manasseh Sogavare tried to make peace by offering compensation 
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payments to the belligerents.103 On 2 August 2000, a ceasefire bought an end to the 
hostilities, during which Australia and New Zealand brokered the Townsville Peace 
Agreement (TPA) that was signed on 15 October 2000. The TPA aimed to disarm the militias 
and offered an amnesty to those involved in the fighting. The TPA also established the 
International Peace Monitoring Team (IPMT) that was designed to assist with the 
disarmament process and help implement the other aims of the TPA.104  
 
Despite the signing of the TPA the Solomon Islands continued to spiral out of control. 
The government was bankrupt with the GDP falling from US$71 million in 1998 to US$57 
million in 2000 and falling a further 24 per cent between 2000 and 2002.105 Basic functions 
of state, such as education and health, could not be provided and public servants went 
unpaid. The ethnic militias evolved into criminal gangs that extorted money out of 
politicians, while corruption was rife.106 The poor governance structures and corruption also 
meant that many international donors refused to provide aid to the Solomon Islands 
government for fear of the aid being used to fund criminal activity.107 This placed further 
strain on the limited finances of the Solomon Islands government. 
 
When the TPA expired in October 2002 many of its goals such as the disarmament of 
the militias had only been partially successful.108 The Guadalcanal Liberation Front (GLF), 
                                                          
103
 McDougall, Derek. ‘Intervention in Solomon Islands’, The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of 
International Affairs, 93:374, pp. 216. 
104
 ‘Townville Peace Agreement’, http://www.commerce.gov.sb/Gov/Peace_Agreement.htm.  
105
 Ponzio, Richard. ‘The Solomon Islands: The UN and Intervention by Coalitions of the Willing’, International 
Peacekeeping, 12:2, pp. 174. 
106
 Wainwright, Elsina. ‘Responding to State Failure: The Case of Australia and Solomon Islands’, Australian 
Journal of Internationsl Affairs, 57:3. pp. 488. 
107
 McDougall. pp. 217. 
108
 Halvorson, Dan. ‘Reputation and Responsibility in Australia’s 2003 Intervention in the Solomon Islands’, 
Australian Journal of International Affairs’, 67:4, pp. 448 
46 
 
which had refused to sign the TPA, continued to fight the IFM on the Weather Coast of 
Guadalcanal. The abundance of weapons and continued mistrust between the ethnic groups 
prevented the reconciliation between the Guadalcanalese and Malaitans that was envisaged 
in the TPA. Throughout 2002 and 2003 the violence, extortion and corruption continued 
unabated. As the economic and security situation in the Solomon Islands continued to 
deteriorate Prime Minister Sir Allen Kemakeza made a formal request to Australia for 
assistance on 22 April 2003.  
 
This request was accepted by the Pacific Islands Forum and on 24 July 2003 the first 
contingent of the Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands (RAMSI) force landed in 
Honiara, including 105 New Zealand Defence Force personnel and 35 Police Officers.109 The 
New Zealand contribution to RAMSI increased further in late August when an infantry 
company of 125 troops was deployed to the Solomon Islands.110 The key elements of the 
RAMSI mandate were to restore civil order, rebuild and reform the machinery of 
government, stabilise the government’s finances, fight corruption, and help rebuild the 
economy.111 
 
Unlike the intervention in East Timor, New Zealand’s decision to intervene in the 
Solomon Islands was primarily motivated by realist factors such as regional security 
concerns, and New Zealand’s international reputation, rather than liberal factors. This does 
not mean that liberal ideals such as the protection of human rights were not a concern, but 
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that they were not the key factor in determining New Zealand’s decision to intervene. 
Throughout the 1 July 2003 Parliamentary debate on the deployment of troops to the 
Solomon Islands, the issue of human rights was barely mentioned.112 A survey of the press 
releases leading up to the deployment of troops also shows a similar lack of attention given 
to human rights violations. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Phil Goff felt that the ethnic 
tensions in the Solomon Islands and the associated human rights abuses had largely been 
resolved by the TPA. 113 If protection of human rights was the primary reason for the 
intervention, the question must be asked why it took New Zealand and Australia so long to 
intervene. Surely if the protection of human rights was the major issue an intervention 
would have taken place when an estimated 35,000 Malaitans were being ethnically cleansed 
from parts of Guadalcanal. However, neither Australia nor New Zealand were willing to 
intervene at that time. It is also worth noting that Prime Minister Kemakeza’s request for 
assistance on 22 April 2003 was not the first time the Solomon Islands had appealed for 
assistance. The Solomon Islands’ government had previously appealed to Australia for 
assistance prior to and after the coup in June 2000, but the requests were not deemed a 
priority at the time.114 
 
The decision to intervene in the Solomon Islands was primarily driven by realist 
concerns about regional security, the threat of having a failing, or failed state in the Pacific 
region, and restoring law and order to the Solomon Islands. International concern regarding 
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the security implications of failed states had been growing since the mid 1990’s.115 Failed 
states can also be used as bases for trans-national criminal activities such as drugs 
production and smuggling, arms and people trafficking, and money laundering. Failed states 
are also often used as safe havens for terrorist organisations. The weak governance of failed 
states often leads to porous borders where there is a lack of control over what enters and 
exits the state. This can have serious security implications for neighbouring states and the 
wider region. For example, it was thought that the bombs used in the 1998 embassey 
bombings in Kenya and Tanzania were smuggled across the borders from Somalia, a failed 
state.116  
 
International concern over failed states was magnified after the September 11 2001 
terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. It had become evident that failed states 
not only posed a serious security risk to their neighbours, but also to the wider international 
community. Afghanistan, a failed state, provided a safe haven from where Al Qaeda could 
plan and operate its terrorist activities. In 2002 President Bush stated that “the events of 
September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a 
danger to our national interests as strong states.”117 The threat of weak states and 
international terrorism to the Pacific region was reinforced after the 2002 Bali bombings 
where 202 people were killed, including three New Zealanders. The events of September 11, 
2001 and the Bali Bombings, helped focus New Zealand’s resolve to address the threat of 
failed states in the Pacific region. 
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By 2003 the Solomon Islands was displaying many of the characteristics of a failing or 
failed state; a total breakdown of law and order, a government that had lost its monopoly 
over the use of violence, and a government that did not have control over all its territory. 
The Solomon Islands government was also unable to provide basic services such as health 
and education, or pay its civil servants. 118 Ethnic tensions also continued to simmer as many 
Solomon Islanders transferred their loyalty from the government to ethnic groupings to 
ensure their protection and well being.  The Australian Strategic Policy Institute reported in 
early 2003 that “The country has virtually ceased to function as a sovereign state, and on its 
present trajectory there is a high risk that its land and people will become effectively 
ungoverned.”119  
 
As the Solomon Islands government did not have the capacity to control law and 
order, it was felt that an intervention led by Australia with assistance from New Zealand was 
necessary to prevent the Solomon Islands from becoming a failed state.120 In the 
parliamentary debate about the decision to intervene in the Solomon Islands the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Phil Goff stated “We as a country cannot afford to allow a small neighbour 
to suffer from this condition, and to continue to deteriorate further to the point of being a 
failed state. We cannot afford that, because as we know from Afghanistan, a failed state 
very quickly becomes a haven for drug smugglers, arms traffickers, people smugglers and, 
potentially, terrorism.”121 The Minister of Defence, Mark Burton, stated that “The collapse 
of law and order has led to significant loss of life, destruction of homes, and the 
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displacement of many families. The machinery of government is failing and the provision of 
even the most basic services is at risk.”122  
 
There was also a concern that the instability in the Solomon Islands could spread to 
other states in the Pacific.  Mark Burton, stated that “The return of stability to the Solomon 
Islands is vital for the security of our region.”123 The fear of contagion was heightened given 
the poor governance structures of many Pacific states and the recent history of the Pacific 
that included the Bougainville conflict in the late 1990’s, and the 2000 coup in Fiji. The 
threat of contagion was a real concern given the manner that the conflict in Bougainville 
spread to the Solomon Islands in 1998 with guns and refugees being transferred across the 
border.124 The primary concern here was that continued instability in the Solomon Islands 
could have re-ignited the conflict in Bougainville that had been bought to an end after a 
successful intervention by Australia and New Zealand in 1998.  
 
The decision to intervene was also motivated by a desire to maintain New Zealand’s 
international reputation and it relationship with Australia. There is an international 
expectation that New Zealand will play a significant role in ensuring the security and stability 
of the South Pacific.  This role is not limited to providing diplomatic and economic support 
to the smaller Pacific states, but includes actively policing the region if the need arises. If 
New Zealand had not supported the intervention it would have placed considerable strain 
on the relationship with Australia and raised questions about New Zealand’s commitment to 
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upholding peace and security in the Pacific region. As with the intervention in East Timor, 
Australia expected New Zealand to contribute to any intervention to restore stability to the 
Solomon Islands. Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer stated that Australia would 
“very much look to our friends in New Zealand” and “We hope and I’m confident there will 
be a significant New Zealand contribution.”125 Later in 2003 the Australian High 
Commissioner to New Zealand, Alan Hawke, raised concerns about New Zealand’s 
relationship with Australia stating that the relationship was ‘finely poised’ and could go ‘one 
way or another’, he further stated that “New Zealand is already being criticised for not 
pulling its weight in this region, and now we discover that the Government will only provide 
troops if it likes the job they’re being asked to do and can look good doing it.”126 By 
contributing to the intervention New Zealand could allay some of Australia’s concerns that it 
was not contributing enough to the region and that it was an ally that could be relied on. 
This was important after the divergence in policy between Australia and New Zealand over 
the Iraq invasion in 2003. 
 
New Zealand’s concern about its international reputation was not solely based on its 
relationship with Australia. New Zealand was also concerned about its relationship with 
other Pacific Island states and the international community as a whole. In October 2000, the 
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) agreed to the Biketawa Declaration. The Biketawa declaration 
outlines the course of action PIF members should take when confronted with a crisis similar 
to that in the Solomon Islands. The declaration states: “Forum Leaders recognised the need 
in time of crisis or in response to members’ request for assistance, for action to be taken on 
the basis of all members of the Forum being part of the Pacific Islands extended family. The 
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Forum must constructively address difficult and sensitive issues including underlying causes 
of tensions and conflict (ethnic tensions, socio-economic disparities, lack of good 
governance, land disputes and erosion of cultural values).”127 If New Zealand was unwilling 
to assist a member of the PIF in the manner agreed upon under the Biketawa Declaration, 
other Pacific Island states may have begun to question New Zealand’s commitment to the 
region’s security. Would New Zealand provide support to them if they were in similar 
situation? Or would New Zealand leave them to suffer their own fate? Although the 
Biketawa Declaration is not a binding agreement, it could be seen as reneging on an 
international agreement if New Zealand did not assist the Solomon Islands after they 
requested help. If New Zealand did not assist Australia there could have been a negative 
impact on New Zealand’s influence in the Pacific and on its international reputation, 
especially in regards to its commitments to the ‘War on Terror’ and its relationship with the 
United States.  
 
Similar to the intervention in East Timor, it was important to the Labour government 
that any intervention had UN approval or regional consensus. The government was 
concerned about the perception among other Pacific Island states that New Zealand and 
Australia were intervening like ‘big brother’ in a small Pacific Island. It was thought that 
similarities may be drawn between the invasion of Iraq and any intervention in the Solomon 
Islands128 and that it may appear to other smaller Pacific states that Australia and New 
Zealand were putting together a Pacific ‘coalition of the willing’. This concern was 
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heightened given Australia’s participation and support of the invasion of Iraq earlier in 
2003.129 
 
Given the government’s concerns, obtaining consent from the Solomon Islands 
government and support from the international community was an important factor in the 
decision to intervene. However, obtaining a UN Security Council mandate for any 
intervention was unlikely. The Solomon Islands’ diplomatic relations with Taiwan, which was 
a major aid donor, would have drawn a likely veto from China to any potential 
intervention.130 As an UN Security Council approval was unlikely it was felt that any 
intervening force should be sanctioned by the PIF and include contributions from as many 
Pacific states as possible. To this end, New Zealand and Australia appealed to the principles 
of the Biketawa Declaration to gain a consensus on the intervention from the PIF. After 
consultation, the PIF Foreign Ministers supported an intervention on 30 June 2003. On 17 
July 2003 the Solomon Islands government unanimously approved the intervention. The 
intervention was given further legitimacy by the contributions from a wide range of Pacific 
states, not just Australia and New Zealand. The emphasis on building a multinational 
approach and gaining international legitimacy for the intervention is an example of New 
Zealand adhering to liberal ideals that security is best achieved via cooperation rather than a 
unilateral approach. 
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Conclusions 
 
The two case studies assessed in this chapter demonstrate that the motivations to 
intervene in East Timor differed from those in the Solomon Islands. The decision to 
intervene in East Timor is best explained by the liberal factors of protecting the human and 
democratic rights of the East Timorese. New Zealand had no national interests at stake in 
East Timor, and from a realist perspective may have preferred East Timor to remain part of 
Indonesia. On the other hand, the intervention in the Solomon Islands is best explained by 
the realist factors of regional security concerns and upholding New Zealand’s relationship 
with Australia. The emerging norm of humanitarian intervention and assisting a state in 
trouble as envisaged in the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ was evident in both of the case 
studies. However, the emerging norm was likely to be more of an enabling factor rather 
than the primary motivating factor.  
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Chapter Four: New Zealand’s Interventions Outside 
the Asia-Pacific Region 
 
Bosnia 
 
The conflicts that plagued the former Yugoslavia during the 1990’s began after 
Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence on 25 June 1991.131 Initially the Yugoslav 
Army attempted to prevent Slovenia’s break away from the union but after a short conflict a 
cease fire was brokered by the European Community on 2 July 1991. Unlike Slovenia, which 
gained independence with little bloodshed, Croatia fought a bitter conflict from July 1992 to 
1995 to gain its independence from Yugoslavia. One of the features of the Croatian War was 
the use of paramilitary forces, both Serbian and Croatian, to intimidate and terrorise other 
ethnic groups. The aim of these intimidation campaigns was to ethnically cleanse areas to 
create homogenous ethnic regions that would strengthen their claim to the area. On 2 
January 1992, a UN brokered cease-fire was agreed, while the European Community 
recognised Croatia as an independent state on 15 January 1992.  To support the ceasefire 
the UN Security Council passed resolution 743 that established the United Nations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR).132 UNPROFOR’s primary mandate was to help create the 
security conditions where a final settlement could be negotiated, ensure the security of the 
three UN Protected Areas, and to assist with the delivery of humanitarian aid.133  
 
Once the European Community recognised Croatia as an independent state in early 
1992, it became apparent that if Bosnia did not move towards independence it would 
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remain part of a Serb dominated Yugoslavia. However, before Bosnia would obtain 
independence its multi-ethnic population would endure three years of brutal fighting. At the 
outbreak of war the Bosnian population was estimated to be 49% Bosnian Muslim, 32% 
Bosnian Serb, and 17% Bosnian Croat.134 The Bosnian population was intertwined with no 
ethnic group dominating any large areas of the country. As the fighting in Croatia subsided 
in January 1992, the Serb dominated Yugoslav Army withdrew its forces and heavy 
weaponry from Croatia and established positions around major towns and cities in Bosnia, 
including the capital Sarajevo.  On 29 February and 1 March 1992, a referendum was held in 
Bosnia asking “Are you in favour of a sovereign and independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, a 
state of equal citizens and nations of Muslims, Serbs, and Croats and others who live in 
it?”135 The referendum was boycotted by much of the Bosnian Serb population who had 
already declared their own autonomous zones. Despite the Bosnian Serb boycott, an 
estimated 64% of the population voted in the referendum with the result being nearly 
unanimous in favour of an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina.136  
 
Immediately after the results of the referendum were announced Serb paramilitary 
groups established roadblocks and sniper positions throughout Bosnia.  The European 
Community attempted to resolve the situation in Bosnia by political means, however this 
was unsuccessful after a proposal to divide Bosnia into 10 ethnic ‘cantons’ was rejected by 
the Croat population.137 The chances of the escalating violence being resolved by political 
means were further diminished after the Bosnian Serbs declared the Serb Republic on 27 
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March 1992.138 Following the Declaration of the Serb Republic, Serbian paramilitary groups, 
including Arkan’s Tigers, began to ethnically cleanse the region of non-ethnic Serbs.139 This 
included the establishment of detention camps and systematic destruction of buildings and 
other objects of cultural significance to the Muslim population.  
 
In response to the referendum and the increasing violence, the European 
Community and the United States recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign state on 6 
April 1992.140 The UN recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina on 22 May 1992141 and imposed 
sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  The UN also extended the mandate of 
UNPROFOR to include operations in Bosnia. However, as there was no peace to keep in 
Bosnia the main objectives of UNPROFOR in Bosnia were to secure Sarajevo airport, assist in 
separating the belligerents, assist with the transfer of humanitarian aid, and to protect the 
UN safe zones established to provide a safe haven for Bosnian Muslim civilians. By 
separating the belligerents it was hoped a degree of confidence could be established that 
would enable the conditions where a peace settlement could be negotiated.  
 
Despite the presence of UNPROFOR, the fighting intensified and by November 1992, 
an estimated 1.5 million people, or one third of the population, were refugees.142 Evidence 
also began to emerge that mass killings, mass rape, and ethnic cleansing were taking place 
throughout Bosnia.  Detention camps were also being established by Bosnian Serbs to 
detain the Muslim population. In 1993 the UN Security Council authorised an increase of 
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10,000 extra peacekeepers for Bosnia. However, the troops never materialised and the UN 
could not protect civilians in the ‘safe-havens’. This placed enormous pressure on the 
credibility of the UN and its ability to resolve the conflict. International resolve to address 
the conflict increased after reports of mass atrocities were verified, and the shelling of a 
market place in Sarajevo that killed 68 civilians and wounded another 197 on 5 February 
1994.143 On April 27, 1994, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 914 that authorised 
an additional 6,500 troops to be deployed to assist UNPROFOR in Bosnia.144 
 
On 23 May 1994, in response to the request from the UN for more troops, the New 
Zealand government announced that it would contribute a reinforced infantry company of 
250 personnel to assist with the UNPROFOR operations in Bosnia. The deployment 
represented the largest operation undertaken by the New Zealand Defence Force since the 
Vietnam War. The infantry company would be deployed along side a British Battalion, but 
would remain under New Zealand command. It was determined that the size of the force 
was large enough to ensure it could respond to and fulfil the tasks requested of it, but also 
large enough to be mainly self-sufficient despite being stationed with a British Battalion. 
Although public opinion was evenly split on the issue,145 the decision was supported by the 
majority of Parliament, with only two minor parties, New Zealand First and the Alliance, 
opposed to the decision.  
 
The decision to intervene in Bosnia is best explained by liberalism. The decision was 
primarily motivated by New Zealand’s support for the UN, while New Zealand’s role on the 
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Security Council at the time as also a significant factor. While the liberal paradigm offers the 
best explanation for the intervention, the decision was also influenced by realist elements, 
in that the National government had a desire to develop New Zealand’s reputation and 
international credibility.  
 
Initially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs opposed any deployment to Bosnia arguing 
that Bosnia was not in New Zealand’s sphere of interest, and that any deployment of troops 
should come primarily from European states.146 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that 
New Zealand’s area of interest was the Pacific, and that this is where New Zealand should 
focus its defence policy and any peacekeeping missions. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Don 
McKinnon added that the days of New Zealand automatically contributing to a European 
war were over.147 Don McKinnon also felt that New Zealand had demonstrated its 
commitment to the UN and its peacekeeping operations by contributing to peacekeeping 
forces in Somalia and Cambodia, both of which he argued were in New Zealand’s wider 
sphere of influence.  
 
Unlike the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which initially opposed any deployment to 
Bosnia, the Ministry of Defence took a broader view of what constituted New Zealand’s 
national interests and supported a New Zealand troop contribution to UNPROFOR. The 
Ministry of Defence viewed New Zealand’s interests as including upholding the credibility of, 
and supporting the UN. The Secretary of Defence, Gerald Hensley, argued that continued 
support for the UN was a cornerstone of New Zealand’s foreign policy and stated that New 
Zealand’s national interests “are not just regional, they include support of the United 
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Nations. Our national interest...must be balanced with our interests in the continued 
credibility of the UN.”148 Mr Hensley believed that the credibility of the UN was at stake, less 
in terms of the eventual outcome of the situation in Bosnia, but in the UN’s ability to garner 
the will of the international community to deal with the issue. Mr Hensley argued that the 
UN would not be judged harshly if it could not resolve the conflict in Bosnia, only if it failed 
to act. Mr Hensley also stated that the “criticism will rest on the shoulders of those nations 
whose unwillingness to take part was the root cause of the United Nations failure. The 
harshest criticism will belong to those whose deeds did not measure up to the words.”149  
 
The Prime Minister, Jim Bolger, agreed with the Ministry of Defence’s position, that 
supporting the credibility of the UN was an important aspect of New Zealand’s foreign 
policy. Jim Bolger argued that New Zealand could not pick and choose when it participated 
in UN operations based on geography stating that “The UN mandate is worldwide; human 
suffering is the same worldwide, it is not segmented in zones near and far. There is and can 
be no moral justification for saying that if it is close to New Zealand we are interested, if it is 
a long way away count us out. We cannot and should not ignore suffering on the grounds of 
distance.”150 Bolger also stated “The Government considers it important that New Zealand, 
as a small member state strongly committed to the founding principles of the United 
Nations, plays its part to the greatest extent possible in supporting and implementing the 
decisions of the United Nations Security Council.”151  
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Jim Bolger rejected the notion held by some analysts that New Zealand should not 
deploy troops as there was no peace to keep.152 Bolger believed that the UN had a 
responsibility to try to end the fighting stating “We agreed, as a government, to increase the 
New Zealand contribution because we believe in the United Nations, and in the United 
Nations Protection Force in Bosnia, as one of the few means available to the world to assist 
the people and to help to bring about a negotiated peace”.153 The government believed that 
small states participating in the UN process can bring about positive change and help find a 
peaceful solution to the situation in Bosnia. To achieve this New Zealand had to be an active 
member of the UN, not just debate the issues and take no actual action when needed. 
After initially being reticent, believing that Bosnia was outside New Zealand’s area of 
interest, Don McKinnon argued that while Bosnia was not in New Zealand’s normal sphere 
of interest, the Balkans was at the crossroads of the world and that the risk to world if the 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia went unabated was significant.154 Don McKinnon also 
indicated that supporting the UN’s credibility was an important national interest stating that 
“the world could just shake its head and wipe its hands and walk away. That would be an 
awful situation to occur because it would not give anyone any confidence in the UN. We 
have to work very hard right now to ensure the UN and, more particularly, the Security 
Council’s credibility is maintained.”155  
 
New Zealand’s membership of the UN Security Council during 1993-94 was a 
significant factor in the decision to deploy troops to Bosnia. After New Zealand won a seat 
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on the UN Security Council Don McKinnon indicated that New Zealand would take an active 
role in UN peacekeeping operations stating that “We intend to participate, rather than 
cheering or criticising others in the international community from the sidelines.”156 Prior to 
the announcement of the decision to deploy troops Don McKinnon, stated that New 
Zealand’s membership of the UN Security Council was an influencing factor, but that it did 
not compel New Zealand to contribute, nor was it the dominant factor.157 However, during 
the Parliamentary debate on the decision both Jim Bolger and Don McKinnon linked the 
government’s decision to New Zealand’s membership of the Security Council. Don 
McKinnon stated “Obviously it would be inappropriate for New Zealand to sit on the 
Security Council and make decisions as constantly as it has done on a number of issues, yet 
all the time say “No, we are not prepared to be involved.”158 Jim Bolger stated “In reaching 
this decision, the government has been particularly mindful of the special responsibility New 
Zealand bears at this time as a member of the United Nations Security Council, as well as 
the responsibility New Zealand has as a founding member of the United Nations.”159 The 
statements and position the National government took indicates that the decision to 
intervene in Bosnia was primarily rooted in liberal thought and the belief in the primacy of 
the UN to resolve international conflicts. However, there was also realist thinking 
concerning New Zealand’s reputation that was a contributing factor in the decision to 
intervene. 
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From a realist perspective the intervention was motivated by the National 
government’s belief that it had to develop New Zealand’s international reputation and 
improve its relationship with its traditional allies. When the National Party was voted into 
government in 1990 the new Minister of Foreign Affairs Don McKinnon, was concerned that 
New Zealand’s image on the world stage had suffered in the wake of the nuclear free 
debate and the breakup of the ANZUS alliance. McKinnon stated that “Our international 
image had become a confused and ambiguous one. We were seen as idealistic, some would 
have said naive and even arrogant. We were inclined to extreme positions and probably a 
bit hard to read.”160 Some states viewed New Zealand as isolationist in its approach to 
global politics and security. New Zealand’s main traditional allies, the US, the UK, and 
Australia also questioned New Zealand’s reliability and whether New Zealand would be 
prepared to respond positively to international crises. As such, one of the defence goals of 
the new National government was to re-establish effective defence relationships with New 
Zealand’s traditional partners, especially the US the UK.161 Committing troops to Bosnia 
could be seen as a means of affirming New Zealand’s relationship with its allies, especially 
after it received a direct appeal from John Major, the Prime Minister of the UK, requesting 
that New Zealand contribute to the UNPROFOR force. Don McKinnon also argued that New 
Zealand had to make a contribution to the peacekeeping force in Bosnia if it was to be taken 
seriously in the UN after its membership of the UN Security Council finished.162 
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New Zealand’s international reputation had also come under scrutiny by its stance 
not to remove the arms embargo placed on Bosnia. Many smaller states believed that due 
to New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy New Zealand would not automatically align with the 
permanent Western powers on the Security Council, and would be an effective voice for 
smaller and non-aligned states. However, many of the states who had voted for New 
Zealand were becoming disillusioned with New Zealand’s position regarding the arms 
embargo.163 The arms embargo that came into effect in 1992 was an attempt to contain the 
conflict and mitigate the risk of a larger conflagration. However, one of the side effects of 
the arms embargo was that the Bosnians were largely unable to defend themselves against 
the better equipped and supplied Serbs. The UN General Assembly twice voted to lift the 
arms embargo, but on both occasions the Security Council refused to lift the embargo. New 
Zealand preferred to abstain from the vote rather than risk damaging its relations with 
France and the UK.164 Some states perceived that by abstaining from the vote New Zealand 
defied the will of the General Assembly to protect its own interest.   
 
In particular Malaysia, a predominantly Muslim state, who voted for New Zealand’s 
seat on the UN Security Council and was New Zealand’s largest export market in South-East 
Asia,165 was unimpressed with New Zealand’s position towards Bosnia. Malaysia placed a 
significant amount of diplomatic pressure on New Zealand to contribute to UNPROFOR, and 
to have the arms embargo lifted. The Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir, told Mr Bolger 
that membership of the Security Council “bears with it a grave responsibility” and that 
“Members of the Council must face up to the challenges arising from the numerous tragic 
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conflicts currently raging around the world”.166 Although it is unlikely that pressure from 
Malaysia was the decisive factor, pressure from the international community and New 
Zealand’s desire to be seen as a positive player in the UN contributed to the decision to 
deploy troops to Bosnia.  
 
While building better relations with New Zealand’s allies and developing New 
Zealand’s international reputation may have been an outcome of New Zealand’s decision to 
deploy troops to Bosnia, it is unlikely that these reasons alone were enough to persuade the 
government to contribute New Zealand forces to UNPROFOR. In the parliamentary debate 
on the decision to deploy troops Jim Bolger stated “There may be some foreign benefits 
from this policy but that is not the issue. That was not a major consideration of the 
Government. The consideration on this occasion was when and how New Zealand should 
respond to the UN request and the answer was we can respond, we can do it now, and we 
can do it in a sensible fashion.”167 This further indicates that the main motivating factor was 
New Zealand’s belief in upholding the credibility of the UN as the best means to resolve 
international disputes. 
 
Afghanistan and the War on Terror 
 
After the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C., 
New Zealand contributed political and military support to the ‘War on Terror’. The Special 
Air Service (SAS) was deployed to Afghanistan in 2001, 2004 and 2008, New Zealand 
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contributed to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and led a 
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Bamyan Province from 2003 to 2013. New Zealand 
also deployed the Navy Frigate, Te Mana, on interdiction operations in the Arabian Sea and 
Gulf of Oman as part of ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’. Although New Zealand did not 
support or participate in the invasion of Iraq in 2003, it did deploy army engineers to 
support the reconstruction and stabilisation efforts in Iraq in the aftermath of the Iraq war.  
 
Like the decision to intervene in Bosnia, the decisions to intervene in Afghanistan, 
support the ‘War on Terror’, and deploy army engineers to Iraq was based primarily on 
liberal thinking. The main motivating factor for the intervention in Afghanistan was the 
Labour government’s belief in upholding international law to stop the Taliban from 
providing Al Qaeda a safe haven from where it could operate with impunity.168 The 
government was also appalled by the September 11 terrorist attacks which Helen Clark 
described as being an “attack on humanity as a whole.”169 The decision to deploy army 
engineers to Iraq after the conflict in 2003 further demonstrated the government’s belief in 
upholding international law and supporting the UN. 
 
As a small trade dependent state that lacks the hard power required to assert its 
interests via coercive military or economic means, New Zealand places great significance on 
the integrity of international law and support for the UN. From a New Zealand perspective 
an international system based on the primacy of international law is essential to ensure the 
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flow of trade, technology, and investment that enables New Zealand to maintain its 
standard of living and well being.170 As New Zealand benefits from an international system 
based on the rule of law, its foreign policy is closely aligned with adhering to, and upholding 
international law. New Zealand also believes that international law and the UN are the best 
mechanisms to achieve peace and stability in the international system. The events of 
September 11 2001, demonstrated the far reaching consequences that can occur when a 
state operates outside of international law.  
 
Since coming to power in 1996 the Taliban regime had repeatedly disregarded 
international law by ignoring the UN resolutions that called for it to not provide a safe haven 
for terrorist organisations. After the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-
es-Salaam, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1189 that stressed “every state has 
the duty to refrain from organising, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife 
or terrorism in another state or acquiescing in organised activities within its territory.”171 
Later in 1998, after it was apparent that Al Qaeda was responsible for the bombings, the UN 
Security Council passed Resolution 1214 that was more explicit in its condemnation of the 
Taliban. Resolution 1214 demanded that the “Taliban stop providing sanctuary and training 
for international terrorists and their organisations.”172 After the US indicted Osama Bin 
Laden for responsibility for the East African Embassy bombings, the UN Security Council 
passed Resolution 1267 that demanded that the Taliban turn Osama Bin Laden over to 
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authorities from a country where he has been indicted.173 Despite the numerous requests, 
the Taliban continued to ignore international law and provided Al Qaeda with a safe haven 
from where it could plan and train for its terrorist activities that culminated in the attacks on 
September 11. After the September 11 attacks the Taliban continued to resolutely ignore 
international calls for it not to provide a safe haven to Al Qaeda and to turn Bin Laden over 
to the US for trial.  
 
As the Taliban refused to abide by international law it was recognised that the use of 
military force is, at times, the only viable option available to prevent gross violations of 
international law. Despite multiple UN resolutions and sanctions that called for the Taliban 
not to provide terrorist groups with a safe haven, the Taliban’s behaviour did not alter. As 
the diplomatic options had been exhausted, or ignored by the Taliban, the Labour 
government felt that the only means of ensuring international law was upheld in this 
situation was through military force. Foreign Minister Phil Goff argued that “there are 
clearly times when we are compelled to resort to military action to protect ourselves, to 
prevent appalling human rights abuses and preserve values fundamental to what we are 
and what we stand for.....Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime which hosts it cannot be 
defeated by UN resolutions.”174  As the government was appalled by the terrorist attacks 
and believed that international terrorism was the most serious threat to international peace 
and security,175 it was felt that military action was required to ensure international law was 
enforced and to help prevent any future attacks originating from Afghanistan.  
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The Labour government’s support for the UN and of a multilateral approach to 
address the security threat posed by the Taliban is another example of the liberal approach 
taken in the decision to intervene in Afghanistan. After September 11, the UN Security 
Council passed Resolution 1368 that called on all states to work together to bring to justice 
the perpetrators, organisers, and the sponsors of the terrorist attacks, stressed that those 
responsible for supporting and harbouring the perpetrators would be held accountable, and 
expressed its readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the attacks.176 Prime 
Minister Helen Clark emphasised the need for a multilateral approach to combat terrorism 
during the parliamentary debate where parliament supported the deployment of the SAS to 
Afghanistan. Clark stated “what we know is that no single government can, by itself, 
eradicate terrorism. Terrorism’s ramifications are truly global, and getting on top of them 
requires a very broad response.”177 As the UN had called for members to act, and New 
Zealand had a strong belief in supporting the UN, the Labour government felt obligated to 
assist the UN in the best manner it could.  
 
New Zealand’s commitment to upholding international law and support for the UN 
was further demonstrated by the decision not to join or support the ‘Coalition of the 
Willing’ in the military intervention in Iraq in 2003, but to deploy army engineers after the 
conflict had ended. Helen Clark argued that any military action against Iraq that was not 
authorised by the UN would weaken international law.178 It was also argued that any attack 
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on Iraq could strengthen terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, by providing them with 
propaganda material and justification for their acts of terrorism. New Zealand’s preferred 
solution to the Iraq crisis was to work through the UN, and to allow the weapons inspectors 
enough time to ascertain whether or not Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), or had facilities capable of developing WMDs. If the weapons inspectors 
determined that Iraq had contravened the UN resolutions prohibiting Iraq from possessing 
WMDs and subsequently the UN Security Council approved military action against Iraq, New 
Zealand would have contributed medical or logistical support to the authorized 
intervention.179 As there was no UN Security Council mandate for the military action the 
Labour government believed that any military intervention would be illegal and therefore 
did not support or participate in the initial conflict. 
 
However, after Saddam Hussein had been defeated and the UN Security Council 
passed Resolution 1483 that appealed to UN member states to contribute towards the 
rebuild of Iraq, New Zealand announced that it would deploy 60 army engineers to Iraq and 
a navy frigate to the Straits of Hormuz.180 The importance of working through the UN for 
any military presence in Iraq was paramount for the Labour government. Before making any 
decision on the deployment of military personnel to Iraq, the government expected that the 
UN would have a significant role in the reconstruction of Iraq. Phil Goff stated that “a 
resolution, accompanied no doubt by a call for the international community as a whole to 
assist in the rebuilding process, would clear the way for New Zealand and a wide range of 
other countries to make further contributions across areas such as humanitarian assistance 
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and reconstruction.”181 Helen Clark stated that the “government has consistently said that 
New Zealand was prepared to provide humanitarian and reconstruction assistance at the 
end of the conflict, provided that there was appropriate multilateral cover”182 The UN 
resolution also gave the government assurance that it would not be viewed as an occupying 
power.183 
 
For the Labour government, only the UN had the authority to sanction military 
action. The Labour government also believed that multinational cooperation was the best 
means to achieve peace and stability in the international system.  Phil Goff stated that New 
Zealand’s stance over Iraq was based on “a principled position founded in the conviction 
that world order is best secured through peaceful, multilateral action.”184 However, if the 
UN Security Council sanctioned military action and requested assistance, then as a member 
of the UN New Zealand would be obligated to support the decision. Helen Clark emphasised 
this when she stated that “If we are going to pick and choose the Security Council 
resolutions we uphold, then we contribute to undermining the organisation.185 As the UN 
Security Council passed a resolution calling for assistance to rebuild Iraq, the Labour 
government felt it had to consider the appropriate support New Zealand could offer.  
 
Concerns about the stability of both Afghanistan and Iraq were also factors in the 
decision to take responsibility for a PRT in Afghanistan and to deploy army engineers to Iraq.  
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The PRTs were civil-military units tasked to aid the central government in Kabul extend its 
authority throughout Afghanistan. The PRTs assisted in creating a stable security 
environment that was conducive to rebuilding the infrastructure of Afghanistan that had 
been destroyed by twenty years of war. From 2003 until 2013, New Zealand took 
responsibility for the PRT in Bamyan Province. It was believed that by assisting in the 
development of democratic rights and a free market both Afghanistan and Iraq could be 
more secure. This underlines the liberal thinking behind the decision to deploy troops to 
Afghanistan and Iraq. 
 
The decision to take responsibility for the PRT in Bamyan was largely based on the 
recognition that helping to rebuild Afghanistan was an essential element in the fight against 
terrorism. Helen Clark stated that “it is in the international community’s interest to assist 
the Afghan government.”186 Clark also noted that “without stability, efforts to reconstruct 
this war-torn country cannot proceed effectively.”187 Failure to stabilise and rebuild 
Afghanistan could have led to the conditions where the Taliban or another group could 
wrest control of Afghanistan from the transitional government. The Taliban continued to 
have support and maintained a presence in the areas bordering Pakistan in the South and 
South East of Afghanistan. In other parts of Afghanistan there was concern over the 
influence of local warlords and the control they had over the opium trade which helped 
finance the Taliban and groups that were sympathetic towards Al-Qaeda. For the Taliban 
and the warlords, ongoing instability would provide them with the conditions from which 
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they could flourish. To reduce the influence of the Taliban and the warlords it was essential 
that the central government in Kabul extended its control to the entire country. As this task 
was beyond the capabilities of the central government in Kabul the international community 
had to provide the necessary support.  
 
Similarly, concerns regarding the stability of Iraq played a role in the decision to 
deploy army engineers to assist with the rebuild.  The government was concerned about the 
impact ongoing instability in Iraq could have on the Middle East and the West’s relations 
with the Muslim world.188 As a strategically important state, continued violence and chaos in 
Iraq threatened to destabilise neighbouring countries and had the potential to adversely 
influence the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Any damage to the West’s relationship with the 
Muslim world could impact on the fight against terrorism and lead to an increased risk of a 
terrorist attack. This included the Asia-Pacific region where the concerns of a terrorist attack 
had increased after the Bali bombings in 2002.  
 
While the decision to intervene in Afghanistan was primarily motivated by liberal 
rationale it was not devoid of aspects of realist thinking. The government was keen to 
improve its relationship with the US, with an eye towards opening free trade negotiations. 
After the September 11 terrorist attacks the US warned the New Zealand government that 
its response to the terrorist attacks would impact on the future relations between the two 
countries.189 This may have been a significant factor in New Zealand’s decision to acquiesce 
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to US requests for military support. However, New Zealand’s contrasting approaches to the 
intervention in Afghanistan and the military action against Iraq demonstrate that currying 
favour with the US was not the primary motivator for the decision to intervene in 
Afghanistan. While improved relations with the US may have been a positive outcome of the 
decision to participate in the intervention in Afghanistan it would not have overrode the 
Labour government’s commitment to international law and the UN. If the government 
believed that any military intervention conflicted with its core ideals, especially in relation to 
the UN and international law, it is unlikely that it would have participated.   
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that the decisions to intervene in the two case 
studies outside of the Asia-Pacific region are best explained by liberalism. In both case 
studies New Zealand’s core state interests were not threatened, New Zealand also had no 
real strategic or economic advantages to gain from intervening. The strongest argument for 
the decisions to intervene is that New Zealand was motivated to uphold the UN and 
international law. New Zealand’s preference for multilateral solutions to international 
security matters was also evident. From a constructivist point of view, the decisions were 
influenced by New Zealand’s identity as ‘good international citizen’ that participates in a 
positive manner to resolve international security issues.  
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Conclusion 
This essay set out to assess the motivations for New Zealand’s international 
interventions, to assess if the motivations were different for the interventions inside the 
Asia-Pacific region to those outside, and to assess if the approaches taken by the two main 
political parties in New Zealand were different. While it is difficult to place real life complex 
situations and decision making into neat theoretical boxes, this essay has found that 
liberalism provides the best explanation for three of the four case studies. Each case study 
had a different primary motive, but there was an emphasis on liberal factors such as the 
protection of human rights and democracy (East Timor), support for the UN (Bosnia), and 
upholding international law (Afghanistan). This does not mean that realist and constructivist 
factors did not influence the decision making process, but that they were not the main 
factor in the majority of the case studies. The exception was the intervention in the 
Solomon Islands that was primarily motivated by regional security concerns and maintaining 
New Zealand’s relationship with Australia.  
 
The motives for intervening within the Asia-Pacific region differed only slightly from 
the motivations for intervening outside the region. The intervention in East Timor was 
motivated by the liberal ideal of protecting the human and democratic rights of the East 
Timorese. This is consistent with the liberal motives in the decisions to intervene in Bosnia 
and Afghanistan. However, the intervention in the Solomon Islands demonstrates that New 
Zealand may intervene on more realist grounds if required. As New Zealand is a regional 
leader in the Pacific Islands it is more likely that New Zealand will intervene on realist 
grounds in this region than elsewhere in the world where it has less influence.  
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While it has been argued that the two main political parties in New Zealand have 
differing approaches to international relations, the motivating factors for intervening in the 
four case studies were similar regardless if National or Labour were in government. The 
similarity between the approaches taken by both of the main parties is also evident by the 
fact that all the case studies had cross party support, with only minor parties opposing the 
interventions. Two of the interventions also spanned both parties, with Labour continuing 
New Zealand’s presence in East Timor and National in Afghanistan. This indicates that a 
comparable response to each of the circumstance may have taken place regardless of which 
party was governing at the time. The exception here is that the National party argued that 
New Zealand should have supported the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ during the invasion of Iraq 
in 2003, rather than waiting for a UN request to assist with the rebuild. The similarities in 
the approaches taken by National and Labour does not necessarily mean that the parties 
will react in a similar fashion in the future. Political parties and the people within them 
change over time. However, the similarities are an indicator that if and when comparable 
international situations occur in the future, the approach taken by the two main parties may 
not diverge significantly. 
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